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ON ESCALATION AND DETERRENCE 1
Introduction:
In current discussions of deterrence and arms control it is
often assumed that given the cataclysmic character of thermo-nuolear
weapons both sides share a common interest in stabilizing the
world. Under such circumstances of a shared desire for stability,
danger of war may still exist regardless of anyone's desires due
to the unstable character of extant weapons systems. In writings
which present that as the view of the present world, the soft first-
strike weapons are the villains of the piece for they tempt the
other side to pre-emptive attack. Nuclear war is seen as essentially
an undesired defensive measure on both sides, and the path to
stability is seen to be the removal of those threats to the security
of both nations which each might otherwise seek to answer by
military action.
We do not reject these assumptions. They are partially true.
But they are too simple. They treat nuclear war as a special case
of conflict separate and apart from all other forms and aspects
of international conflict. They treat, therefore, only one source
of possible nuclear war, namely a self-conscious strategic strike
either for pre-emption or to destroy the main enemy. To this main
cause of nuclear war, which must be deterred, is sometimes added,
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2AS afterthoughts accidental war and catalytic war. Also sometimes
thrown in as an afterthought is strategic warfare by escalation
from limited conflict.
It is the thesis of this paper that war by escalation is,
by all odds, the most important case. For exactly the reasons
above specified the probability of either side deliberately laun-
ching a nuolear strike or. the other any time in the next ten years
seems reasonably small. Until some major changes in teohnology
upset the present balance a kind of nuclear stalemate exists.
Given present weapons and weapons plans neither aide can hope to
prevent unacceptable second strike damage from the other. Resort
to strategic nuclear weapons is likely only under a sense of
overwhelmingly critical impending danger. Such dangers may arise,
but only in the context of more limited struggles. We must there-
fore look at these and the circumstances arising in them to reach
sound conclusions about strategic deterrence too. We must look above
all at the conditions under which wars escalate or do not escalate.
Both sides in the world struggle have keenly felt positive aims
beside security from attack. It is true that war in its more violent
forms has become so destructive to both sides that avoiding it
may sometimes become more important than achieving those positive
aims, but as. long as the risk of all out war does not seem too
great, these positive aims will be fought for hard. Going to war
in any given fashion - nuclear, conventional, cold - is a matter
of calculation in which nuclear pre-emption and the fear of such
pre-emption is but one element. How far a struggle may be escalated
3beforo the two sides stop, is determined in ways which it is the
purpose of this paper to examine.
The broad conclusion turns out to be that stability depends
indeed on avoiding first-strike-only weapons, but it also depends
upon maintaining strength across a balanced spectrum of weapons
systems, conventional and nuclear. A nuclear deterrent strategy
accompanied by conventional weakness invites escalation of limited
wars.
Escalation:
Wars have never been total. In every war there has been some
limit to horrors, There have been weapons unused, tactics untried.
Among the restraints have been moral ones. Men have been chastened
by revulsion at germ warfare, or at gas, or at extermination of
prisoners and civilian populations. But moral considerations have
been neither the sole nor even the major block barring wars from
becoming worse and worse without limit. The most powerful barrier
to escalation has been that going the next step seems likely not
to pay.
There can be many reasons why one more weapon's system or one
more piece of terror does not pay. If one is winning anyhow it
may be unnecessary; if retaliation is possible it may be unwise; if
the step is novel uncertainty may becloud its consequences. It is
these limits of escalation which are the subject of the present paper.
Barriers to escalation are of interest in strategic planning
because they determine what a combat ant can afford to win. Any
combat plan which may be proposed must be judged by hia not only
for what its profit would be in the conflict for which it is in-
tended, but also by the consequences which would ensue if the enemy,
pressed by the success of the plan, were to raise the level of con-
flict one notch higher. Simple examples are numerous. Unlimited
submarine warfare in World War I could have severely hurt England
if America had stayed out of the war, but just because the submarine
campaign was effective we did enter. Submarine warfare thus in the
end was counter-productive for Germany. Hot pursuit of the North
Koreans toward the Yalu might have successfully destroyed North
Korean power had the Chinese kept hands off, but the very fact of
Western potential triumph across the Yalu motivated the Chinese to
come in. Destruction of Red airfields in Manchuria might have
turned the tide of war in Western favor if the Russians could have
been counted on not to retaliate; but the very advantage we would
have gained is why they would have retaliated and so why we could
not bomb the Red sanctuary. We were restrained because we believed
that the Russians rather than accepting defeat of their allies,
would escalate the war.
In journalistic writings this mutual restraint is often re-
duced to psychological terms. We act with restraint to avoid
"provoking" them or making them angry. Let us emphasize that our
fear of the Soviet reaction had we violated the sanctuary across
the Yalu was not that. It was not the fear of an irrational Soviet
reflex of tit for tat, nor a fear of setting a legal precedent which
could turn against us, nor fear of an emotional reaction of anger
to the3 sMbol of a frontier violation. The Soviet reaction which
we feared would have been a soberly rational military one. They
would have been pressed to take such actions as bombing our Japanese
bases because our bombing of Chinese airfields and stpply lines
would have been an effective military measure. If not countered,
it could have given us victory. If the American potential actions
in question - the violation of the sanctuary - were just acts of
pique without military consequence, then the Russians might have
ret them by protesting propaganda and symbolic gestures only. But
precisely because violating the sanctuary promised us real advantages,
it had to be foresworn, for the enemy had the potential and the
will not to accept defeat in the limited arena of Korea. The enemy
could expand the war to a broader one if need be. The reaction we
feared was one of military calculation, not one of irrational
tension.
In treatises on military theory the concepts we have been
presenting appear in a quite different form. They appear in dis-
cussions of committed forces and reserves. To win tactical successes
with coimaitted forces may not be the road to victory. Ultimate
triumph is apt to go to the side which has reserves at the end
which it could, if need be, throw into battle. Having the potential
to escalate a war is, in a sense, having a reserve.
In this epoch of mass destruction weapons, uncommitted weapons
systems more powerful than those yet used are a kind of reserve
to which classical military reasoning may be applied. The weapons
in reserve rather than the battles with tactically committed weapons
6may be what determines the outcome. Whole weapons systems as
reserves do not appear in classical military theory for classical
theory dealt with a situation in which each weapon was carried by
a man. Commitment of weapons meant commitment of men. Since
weapons were so close to a linear function of manpower, analysts
could talk about the reserves as men. Classical theory dealt with
a technology which was niggardly of weapons of destruction. There
existed few options in ways of killing people; science has now
provided many. Men in the past went into battle with whatever
effective weapons they could, But with modern technology the choice
of which to use among the many effective weapons systems has be-
come an all important strategic decision.
There are also decisions about the arena of warfare. The
Russians have overwhelming superiority around Berlin, but if we
chose to respond to an attempted seizure of Berlin by conflict
throughout Eastern Europe their advantage would be less great. The
Chinese could probably seize Quemoy and Matsu, but they are de-
terred because our response would presumably not be that of a
localized defense of the islands. We could extend the war to a
larger theatre where we have advantages. Once again, the outcome
in a small conflict depends upon what would happen in a larger war
into which one side could transform it at will.
Those transformations are each a form of escalation. Escalation
comes in many dimensions and infinite forms. There is no single
set of steps on the path of escalation. Wars can be extended in
space or time. Dollars, equipment, and manpower can be increased
7by infinite gradations. Weapons can be made more horrible in many
ways. But for purposes of exposition in the present paper, we
shall consider a few rather arbitrary gradations of violence. The
first or mildest level is diplomatic struggle or cold war. A
grade higher is limited conventional war; then limited nuclear was;
and finally all-out central warfare. We may in our first out at
the problem disregard the infinite combinations or forms of struggle
in the interstices of these types.
With these comments as background we turn to consider kinds
of escalation.
First Order Escalation:
The Theory:-- Wars have a tendency to escalate up to that
level of intensity at which the losing side would find itself
still worse off if it intensified the struggle one step further.
Efforts by the momentary loser to redress the balance by drastic
action are the primary source of escalation. Its limit is reached
when he no longer has the capability or will thus to Improve his
position. As in chess at the end of the game, a war is won when
nothing that the loser is capable of doing by way of added attack to
violence will make his situation better but only worse.
Wars may also under some circumstances be escalated by
the winning side. A circumstance where the winner will change the
game is one where he can win even more cheaply and completely
by applying more violence. That is most apt to be true when the
loser is so weak that the latter can inflict no added penalties on
8the winner to make him pay for escalating the war. Under those
circumstances added troops, weapons, or tactics may serve to bring
the struggle to a final conclusion.
We illustrate circumstances where the winner has esoalated
war:
1) The United States, when it had almost won World War II
introduced the atomic bomb for the sake of ending the war without
a costly landing on the beaches. The loser, Japan, was no longer
capable of effective retaliation to deter the U.S. from such
escalation.
2) The Nazis in part adjusted the level of their brutality
to the retaliatory capabilities of their enemies. Western Allied
forces were treated in general according to the laws of war. The
Jews were burned in furnaces in what was as close to a total war
of unlimited extermination as mankind has ever known. There was
no retaliation of which the Jews were capable. War under such
imbalance of forces is sheer sadism. Except where a pathological
ideology such as that of the Nazis makes men inflict death and
destruction for their own sake, a complete imbalance of forces
such as that between Nazis and Jews normally leads to the end of
violence by surrender, a privilege denied to the Jews.
Surrender is seldom unconditional. Paul Kecakemeti in his
remarkable study of Strateic Surrender,1 has illustrated how under
lPaul Ke c akeme-ti, Stratego~ Surrender, Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1958.
9almost all circumstances at the end of a struggle the loser re-
tains enough power to punish the winner, even if only in a dying
gesture of defiance, and thus to make it worthwhile for the winner
to grant some marginal favors to the loser. The loser trades his
residual power for better terms of surrender. The loser% residual
power may include a capability for escalating the war or a capability
to penalize and thus limit escalation by the winner.
How do these observations bear on the conditions of escalation?
They require us to slightly modify and generalize our first state-
ment about when escalation occurs. Our first formulation was that
ware are escalated by the side which is losing, and are escalated
up to the point where that side would be still worse off in an
intensified struggle. But then we noted that escalation may some-
times be undertaken by the winner. The more general statement would
be: A war is escalated by the side which finds itself disadvantaged
by the current limitations on modes of struggle. And as long as
one side feels thus disadvantaged, it will escalate or threaten to
escalate the conflict unless there is no way for it to do so without
suffering even worse consequences than the current disadvantage.
To be losing is the most common and obvious kind of disadvantage.
But the winning side may also feel at a disadvantage as the United
States did when faced with the prospect of landing troops on
heavily defended beaches. The "disadvantaged" side will look for
a way to change the terms of combat, If the disadvantaged side
has in reserve a way to overcome its handicaps by escalating the
struggle it may do so. Or it may be able to compel the advantaged
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side to foreswear using its advantage by merely threatening to
escalate the war (assuning its power to carry out the threat is
credible.) The advantaged side may feel obliged to foreswear
winning what it is capable of winning if the price is the escala-
tion of the war.
That is our point in its most general form. From here on,
whether we use the jargon of "advantage" and "disadvantage" or the
clearer, though more narrowly applicable language of "win" and
"lose", the carefully defined phenomenon is what we are referring
to.
When the side which feels itself hampered by the prevailing
level of force comnitmentschooses to improve its situation by
escalating the struggle, it is clearly (in the absence of mistakes)
taking an action to the disadvantage of the other side. Both
sides do not gain by escalation for the increased destructiveness
of the struggle can, at best, benefit one side only. It may,
indeed, benefit neither side. It follows that if the disadvantaged
side refrains from escalation because it would find itself still
worse off under more violent modes of struggle, then this choice
may be to the advantage of the winning side too. War is not a
zero-sum game. It can be to the advantage of both sides to avoid
more violence. That is why arms controls can sometimes be agreed to.
That is why the players can reach tacitly agreed to limitations
which both sides respect.
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The choice whether a limitation shall be kept lies, however,
essentially with the potential loser under the status guo, for it
is he who sees a conflict between advantages of a new mode of
struggle and disadvantages of added los and destruction. The
side that is benefiting anyhow has no reason to change the rules
of the game; but it must suffer with the decision to change the
rules made by the side it is beating unless it can offer generous
incentives to the loser to accept the status guo. In summary, a
limited war (and we have said earlier that in some sense all wars
have been limited) is stable at its particular level of violence
when either one of two conditions prevails. Either a more violent
mode of struggle is more painful to both sides or it is more pain-
ful for one side, and that one is the side suffering most from the
present situation.
Some Applications:-- Let us apply some of these considera-
tions to the current balance of power between the United States
and the Soviet Union. Under present circumstances a condition of
stable deterrence probably exists which would prevent either power
from escalating any war, even a limited nuclear war, into an all-
out nuclear war. That statement is, of course, controversial. The
Russians among others deny it. And since the reader may question
it too, perhaps we need carefully to underline what we are asserting
and what not. We are not asserting that all-out nuclear warfare
is impossible or inconceivable. In the next section of this paper
we will discuss how such a holocause which no-one wants might occur
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by miscalculation or out of a sense of necessity, though both
sides wished to avoid it. We are also not asserting that the low-
probability eventuality, nuclear central war, is less important
than the high-probability eventuality, no such war. It is like
the case of the prisoner sentenced to die some time in the next
week, but not told which day. The one-seventh chance that he may
die to-day will certainly dominate what he does -writing his will,
saying his prayers, etc. It still remains true that the strongly
probable --6 to 1-- outcome is that he will survive to-day. We
are in something like that situation concerning nuclear war. And
it is its probabilities only, not its importance, that we are here
discussing. We are asserting that even if a limited war with nuclear
weapons were to take place in Asia, or Western Europe, or Eastern
Europe, that both Russia and the United States would probably
find it to their interest to avoid, if possible, salvos of thermo-
nuclear weapons against each other's homelands.
In thus asserting that strategic nuclear strikes will probably
be avoided even with to-day's largely soft and vulnerable weapons,
we are certainly not minimizing the urgency of achieving greater
mobility and hardness to assure a slow reacting second strike
capability and thus to make the deterrence of nuclear salvos even
more probable. Any rational national leader would probably be de-
terred from launching a nuclear strike even today by the prospective
residual capability which the other side would retain after his
attack. But moderate probabilities in such matters are not good
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enough. Efforts toward increasing the effectiveness of our
deterrent capability by adding to its mobility and survivability
may serve to discourage erroneous gambles by an -enemy in desperate
circumstances. They also add to our security against possible
Soviet offensive scientific break-throughs. They also are desirable
insurance against the chance that our own analysis is too optimistic.
Thus the case for measures like the Polaris increase in the Kennedy
1961 budget revision is overwhelming.
The reason for not expecting escalation of limited wars to
total ones is that it would probably be to the disadvantage of
both sides to raise the violence of even a limited nuclear war
to that of an all-out central war. The losing side in a Soviet-
American limited nuclear war, fought outside American or Soviet
territory would probably in the last analysis feel that it stood
to lose less by losing the war than by bringing thermonuclear bombs
upon itself. European doubts that A*terica would invite nuclear
destruction on herself in order to prevent invasion in Western
Europe are not ridiculous; it is not clear what American behavior
would be, and it might well depend upon circumstances. In parallel
ways the Russian.reaction to loss of Eastern Europe is unpredictable.
They might not resort to a nuclear attack upon the U.S. even if our
troops should somehow occupy Warsaw or Budapest. Though neither side
can count on such self-restraint by the other and must recognize
that major provocations might lead to massive nuclear retaliations,
a great probability exists that either side would cut its losses
and swallow its pride.
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If our argument thus far is correct, then the worst war that
is likely under present circumstances would be a limited nuclear
war. But is there even a high probability of that? What it a oon-
ventional limited war were raging; would that war be likely to
escalate into a limited nuclear war?
We cannot give a confident answer. One might argue that a
limited nuclear war, too, Is so auch worse even than losing a
conventional war that it is in neither side's interest to escalate
up to it. But it is not fully clear that that Is the case; and it
is an issue we will not try to settle here. Suffice it that a
plausible suspicion exists that escalation might occur. Suppose one
side were far superior to the other in the tactical nuclear weapons
available to it. Let us assume for example that under a test ban,
side "A" and side "A" only, had successfully cheated; had built
highly effective small, light, and mobile nuclear weapons in large
numbers; equipped their troops with them and had confidence, as the
result of testing, that these weapons would work. Let us assume
further that that side was losing a conventional war. It could do
one of three things. It could initiate use of its tactical nuclear
weapons in large numbers, compelling the formerly winning side "B!
to recognize that its advantage was gone and that it should end the
war on terms relatively favorable to "A", though "B" might prevent
too unfavorable a set of terms by threatening mischief with its own
inferior but still destructive tactical nuclear weapons. Secondly,
side "A" might launch a few sample tactical nuclear weapons and
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compel results much like those in the first instance, though more
by a process of bargaining and less by destruction. Finally, "A"
might not use its tactical nuclear weapons at all but simply
demonstrate that it had them, and thereby compel side "B" to settle
on terms quite favorable to "A", the conventional loser.
All three of these alternatives, though the last in purest
form, illustrate that the side on the weak end of a nuclear
imbalance could not decisively win a conventional war fought under
the shadow of potential nuclearization, regardless of its con-
ventional strength. The importance of one side gaining a decided
advantage in tactical nuclear weapons is not only its impact if tac-
tical nuclear warfare actually occurs but also the impact of the
shadow of nuclearization on the kind of warfare dne step down the
ladder of intensity, i.e. on conventional war.1
This conclusion has implications for current discussions of
the nuclear test ban. Tests of very small weapons intended for use
in limited warfare can easily be conducted surreptitiously. Since
predominance in such weapons turns out by our analysis to be of
much value even in the normal course of non-nuclear controversy in
a divided world, undetectable cheating against a test-ban would pay,
lSome readers may argue that our analysis is unrealistic, that
if, for example the Russians by cheating on a test ban gained a
decisive tactical nuclear weapon advantage over us, but we were
beating them in a conventional war, they would not be able to use
their tactical nuclear weapons because we in turn would then escalate
to war to strategic nuclear warfare. This is possible, but far
from invalidating the analysis, only shows that escalation goes
through the stages we have outlined until whatever point is reached
where it is not to the loservs advantage to raise the level of the
war one step more in intensity. It thus remains important to have
decisive strength at a level of violence higher than that of the
actual conflict.
ji i i 1.1.1 - - -- - - -
Small tests must therefore be prevented by inspection. It has been
estimated that surreptitious cheating with small explosions only,
might improve the tactical nuclear weapon capability by the cheating
side by a factor of two to five. That is not predominance enough
to justify that side in launching limited nuclear war; the power
of the nuclear weapons on the less efficient side would still be
enough to make such warfare generally a fool's game. But a potential
margin of this size would be significantly adverse to the non-
cheating side, not in tactical nuclear warfare itself, but in
what the honest side could dare to win in conventional warfare,
faced by such a tactical nuclear threat from its enemy.
The same analysis can be carried one step further. For the
United States to have a marked advantage over the Soviet Union in
conventional weapons is important not so much for the case of
limited war as for its influence upon diplomatic negotiations, or
as they are popularly called, the cold war. The dire danger of
escalation created by any war between the Soviets and the United
States is such that any war, even a limited one, involving direct
confrontation of their forces is extremely unlikely. Note that
all wars whichhave occurred since World War II have been limited
not only in the weapons used but in the forces committed; they have
not involved forces of both great powers simultaneously. The
Russians have kept the Red Army from coming to gun point with
American or even Western troops. Our forces and Soviet forces
15ee Donald G. Brennan and Morton H. Halperin, Considerations
of a Weapon Test Ban in Arms Control and National Secuit New York:
Harcourt Brace, 961.
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have been the backdrop against which a diplomatic struggle has
been conducted.
It could be argued from that fact that the United States
does not need superiority over the Russians in conventional forces
but needs only such conventional forces as can handle brushfire
and Korea-type operations. Our strategic forces in the background
would continue to make it unwise for the Russians to use their
strong conventional forces directly against ours. The argument is
that even though our conventional forces are weaker than the
RussiansQ, the Russians are unlikely to throw their superior forces
into a situation where they would crush our troops for that would
invite escalation. This argument concerning conventional troops
is the exact analogue of the strategic deterrence argument. It
says that one does not need to have forces enough to win provided
one can punish aggression beyond what is acceptable. To a limited
degree the argument is valid.
It is valid, however, only so long as we confine our attention
to the conventional war situation viewed in isolation. It breaks
down as soon as one considers the consequence of such conventional
weakness on the cold war. We can inflict peaceful political defeat
upon the Soviet bloc through the processes of diplomacy only to the
extent that our conventional forces are adequate to deter the Soviets
from taking military action to redress defeats which politics may
inflict upon them. If the free world had had available an effective
military answer to localized Soviet troop movements, the Hungarian
revolution might well have succeeded rather than failed, for the
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Russians would then have hesitated to escalate the civil conflict
by an open military invasion. So too, were our military capabilities
concerning Berlin sufficient to make a showing there, our diplomatic
prospects would obviously be. vastly improved.
Laos is perhaps a star case in point. Success in the political
arena has reflected almost mathematically the balance of consequences
that could be anticipated if the war were escalated. Each side has
reserves it could use, but not without suffering unwanted conse-
quences. Despite unfavorable terrain and logistics, the United
States could provide such military forces as would turn the tide
against the rebels, but only if the war remained a Laotian one.
That would not happen. American intervention would presumably lead
to Chinese intervention with military and political consequences
even worse than now. On the other hand such events are also feared
by the Laotians, North Vietnamese, and Russians. Ho Chi Min is
undoubtedly terrified of Chinese troops establishing themselves in
his land en route to Laos. Khrushchev has good reason to share that
fear, but to a lesser degree. He would hardly enjoy an expansion
of Chinese power even if in this situation it would not be at great
cost to him. Thus a certain restraint has been shown by Viet Minh
and by the Russians. The Americans pose a very real threat to
them when they suggest that they might escalate the war even though
the communist side has a strong military answer. The American
threat is a threat, however, whose credibility is limited by our
prospect of losses if we carried through. Thus each side would be
worse off if the war expanded though in the last analysis the
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Western position is weaker than Russia's (probably not than Viet
Minh's.) It is weaker not as forces stand now, but as they would
stand at the end of a general escalation of the war. The conse-
quence is a settlement wanted by both sides in preference to
expanded warfare, but one in which the communists have the edge.
The point we have been making is a simple one but one more
often neglected than noted in practice.1 The point is that the
less violent forms of struggle are much more frequent than the
more violent forms and so the most common advantage gained by
having strength at each level of violence is not the advantage
of use but the edge gained in the more usual though less intense
forms of struggle that occur in its shadow.
Second Order Escalation:
For purposes of clarity we greatly oversimplified the above
presentation. As one simplification we assumed that the facts
which each side perceived were the real facts. Clearly this is
often not the case. One combatant or both may see the facts in
1 Planners usually neglect the danger of escalation because
they are usually given an isolated problem to solve, as the be-all
and end-all of their activity. They are supposed to figure out how
to win a particular war. They come up with solutions, but ones
often accompanied by a caviat that if the whole character of the
war changes, then, of course, all bets are off. Consideration of
such major eventualities are asserted to be someone else's business
not that of the specialized planner. It may be possible for him to
figure out how to win a limited war on the assumption that no ruclear
weapons are introduced or equally to figure out how to win a limited
nuclear war on that assumption that massive retaliation is kept out
of the picture. But to make plans without reference to the control
of such escalation is clearly but a pedantic exercise.
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error, and it is the facts as perceived, not the real facts,
which count in the short run. (In the long run the test of ex-
perience may make perceptions approach to reality.) Everything
we have so far said about escalation should for accuracy be restated
in subjective terms. It is the side that believes it is losing
not the side which is losing which may escalate a war. It may fail
to do so not if the results will be even worse for it, but if it
believes the results will be even worse for it. Both sides may
think themselves to be the weaker and thus think escalation to their
advantage, in which case both may simultaneously raise the tempo
of the war. Or, as in the present world situation, both sides
may feel that history is on their side and that they are winning
the struggle. This is a stabilizing set of beliefs which at least
on one side is presumably erroneous.
It goes without saying that the probability of erroneous or
divergent perceptions of the situation are greater the finer the
calculations of advantage on the two sides. There may be situations
where the facts are so unambiguous and the advantages so clear that
both sides will perceive them in the same way and will assume that
the other side also so perceives them. But as the advantages become
less clear, calculations enter an area of indeterminacy. In this
area there may be divergent perceptions or there may be a comonly
shared perception that neither side knows for sure to be true.
And finally each side, though it believes it knows the facts,
wonders whether the other side perchance sees the facts differently
and intends to act accordingly. This leads us to a new and further
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set of conditions which may lead to escalation.
Third Order Escalation:
At the most sophisticated level of analysis we must say that
it is not even the perceived facts themselves which may lead to
escalation but rather certain perceptions of the possibilities of
perceptions and misperceptions by others. In these perceptions
timing also is a factor. If for example, both sides recognise that
the disadvantaged side is about to escalate a struggle in order to
regain the advantage, then the side that was winning before (and
for that reason does not itself wish any escalation) may choose to
jump the gun and take the first step of an escalation which it
believes that its adversary's interests makes inevitable in any
case. Third order escalation, in short, is not an intensification
of the struggle because one sees escalation as in one's own
advantage but because one sees a necessity to gain the first draW
over the side in whose advantage it is. It is an attempt to pre-
empt a blow likely to c ome from the side which is presumed to
see an advantage in escalation.
These more intricate considerations add greatly to the dangers
of escalation, for if a weapon system gives considerable advantage
to the first blow, then not only must each side, "A", be alert to a
situation in which the other side, "B", may see an advantage to
itself in escalation, but each, "A", must also be alert and ready
to strike first in a situation in which the other, "B", may rightly
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or wrongly see an advantage to the other, "A", in escalation which
it, "B", would therefore try to pre-empt. There is an infinite
regress in such calculations. The important point is that in a
weapon situation in which pre-emption gives advantages, one must
anticipate every possible calculation or miscalculation by the other
side which might lead them to pre-empt, assuming all the while that
they are doing the same. And having made the calculations, one
must act first. It is to reduce the danger of third order escalation
that hardened and mobile slow-reacting weapons systems are to be
preferred over soft fixed ones.
Some Implications'
Our analysis of escalation leads to a number of conclusions
about current American defense policy some of which have already
been foreshadowed.
It suggests, for example, that we can risk an uninspected
test ban only if no vital national interest of the Soviet Union
is likely to be affected by the outcome of limited conventional
warfare, actual or potential. Suppose that by clandestine
testing the Soviet Union acquired a substantial advantage in
tactical nuclear weapons. She would then have a strong incentive
to escalate any sort of non-nuclear struggle that was going very
badly for her up to that level at which her advantage could be
used. Anticipating such an eventuality would make her prone to
engage in tests. If the Soviets believe their vital interests are
likely to be at stake in any future conventional limited war
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situation then their temptation to engage in tactical nuclear
weapon tests would be enormous for they will realize that con-
ventional wars are fought under the shadow of potential escalation
to nuclear ones. The argument is the same by a two-step process for
the effects of clandestine testing on merely potential conventior.al
warfare, i.e., cold war. The threat of using tactical nuclear
weapons would have disastrous weight in a diplomatic situation.
Thus our analysis lends weight to what has been the American
position on the importance of inspection, a position which some
Americans are now beginning to question.
Our analysis also suggests that building up of our conventional
forces may be a helpful step toward both stabilization and nuclear
disarmament. Grave dangers are created by current American weakness
in conventional weapons. We have been building substantial nuclear
striking power while letting our conventional forces lag. This
combination of strategic strength and tactical weakness not only
creates a situation in which we might find ourselves losing a
conventional war and tempted to escalate it. (1st order escalation.)
It also creates a situation in which our enemies might recognize
the temptation we were under. They might anticipate that we could
not respond to their provocations in any conventional way. They
might therefore justifiably fear that we might resort to nuclear
retaliation. This creates an incentive for them to pre-empt our
nuclear capability. (3rd order escalation.)
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In contrast to such a situation it would be highly stabilising
for the Soviets to feel that we have strong forces of a conventional
kind and that we have confidence in their value and capabilities.
If we had such forces we would encourage a Soviet expectation
that we would respond to future crises by conventional rather than
by nuclear means. By creating such an expectation we would place
less pressure on the Soviets to themselves engage in nuolear
pre-emption.
The lesson is that it is not by any means alsways stabilizing
for one's enemies to be too weak. It is so, of course, if they
are weak across the board, but nothing can be more terrifying
than an enemy which is weak unless he chooses to go the whole way
into apocalyptic forms of struggle. As long as the Soviets
have a substantial long range missile striking force and substantial
nuclear tactical forces, it is not to our advantage to see them
too decisively reduced in the diplomatic struggle for position in
the world. We should seek to have them retain the hope, though
not the reality, of gain through the normal processes of the cold
war or of bargaining.
The Soviets are in a similar position regarding us. At the
present time, and it was even more so before the Soviets gained a
nuclear capability, it would not be in the Soviet interest to press
us to despair of peaceful means. During the period of the early
1950's when we were weak in limited forces but had the undeterred
power of massive retaliation, the Soviet Union was fully aware of
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these considerations. Faced with our nuclear and only nuclear
supremacy, they refrained from using their manpower to break out
of their perimeter. They knew that further spread of communism
had to be held in check lest we react with the weapons we had, i.e.,
SAC. That situation no longer exists. Now that SAC is deterred
by Soviet missiles, the Soviets can safely provoke us much further.
But there still are limits and these limits are more confined
because our conventional forces are weak. From the Soviet point
of view that increases the chance that we might be driven to
nuclear retaliation.
If the goal of each side was simply stability then neither side
should wish the other to suffer any unacceptable defeats. But each
side in reality also has other and positive aims as well as stability.
It is none the less important to peace that neither side think the
other may gain a decisive advantage unless prevented by all out
means. For if no admissible forms of struggle are available to
defend one 9s interests then there is created the danger of resort
to inadmissible forms. (1st order escalation.) Awareness of
these possibilities and the urge to pre-empt them makes more
dangerous still the operation of the whole system. (3rd order es-
calation.)
Let us take the metaphor of escalation literally and think
of weapons9 systems as being on a ladder, or rather a pair of
ladders, each representing the forces of a major power. Any given
rung on either ladder may be defective or missing. Now looking at
this pair of ladders from the Olympian view of a third party
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concerned only with world stability and prevention of escalation,
what can we say of the consequences of weak or missing rungs? From
that detached perspective we would say that any rungs weak or missing
at the top of either or both ladders are a good thing. Escalation
will stop at a lower level if there is nothing effective available
to move up to. And if the two ladders are uneven in how many top
rungs have been knocked out, that is too bad for the side whose
maximu. available violence is lower, but from an uncommitted third
party view it does not matter. Escalation need go no higher than
one rung above the top of the shorter ladder. Once the side with
most force in reserve has trumped the other side it has normally
no need to go further. So reducing arms at the top of the violence
scale is stabilizing. 1
But rungs missing in the middle of either ladder may be
de-stabilizing. They provide, as we have seen, an incentive to
more rapid escalation. The side possessing forces at a level
of violence where their foes lack them is tempted to escalate the
struggle to that level where it will have an advantage. The
side with a rung missing is tempted to raise the struggle one more
rung to regain some chance of success. If the missing rungs are
symmetrical on the two ladders the consequence is indeterminate.
1Note that this is not an argument against stable deterrent
forces in preference to disarming down to zero. The argument
against a treaty abolishing all missiles, for example, is that
one side might actually secrete a few and gain a decisive advantage.
That is to say, the failure to assure disarmament at the top of the
scale is what is de-stabil1lzTng, not real disarmament at the top.
It discourages escalation by making the steps bigger and more
terrifying, but speeds it up if it does take place, by eliminating
the possibility of small increments of force. So, from an
Olympian point of view we can make a case that disarmament should
start with the most dangerous, i.e., strategic thermo-nuclear
weapons and move down from those only when they have been brought
under control or abolished.
From the viewpoint of a partisan in the struggle interested
both in limiting violence and in maintaining an edge in the bipolar
struggle while doing so, these considerations lead to some obvious
and less obvious conclusions, The obvious conclusion is that
one would like if possible to be stronger than one's potential
foes in each type of warfare. Since that is clearly impossible -
we cannot hope to have a conventional superiority around Berlin,
for example one should at least aim at superiority at several
critical levels of conflict, not just in the most powerful strategic
weapons. Each arm in which one has superiority throws its shadow
over struggles where it is not used but might be, permitting less
violent means to be effectively used in support of policy. Each
arm in which the foe has superiority throws its shadow too, posing
us with the dilemma of accepting failure in those situations or
1There is a good argument against the use of any nuclear weapons,
even the most diminutive, in limited war. The argument is that one
wishes to make the gap between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons use as
wide as possible, thus making escalation harder. What one wishes to
avoid is an unbroken series of small steps all the way from limited t
strategic warfare so one would never know where the limits were. This
argument, however, depends upon the gaps being symmetrical to the two
sides, and furthermore, it disregards the fact that resort to tactical
nuclear weapons may be an alternative to resort to strategic ones. For
a well thought through and judicious resolution of this dilemma see
Henry Kissingervs second thoughts on tactical nuclear warfare in
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of escalating the struggle to fearful proportions.
Specifically, the conduct of successful diplomacy on behalf
of democratic development probably requires that the free world
have several capabilities:
1. Highl mobile conventional forces capable of establishing
order in any part of the world not directly accessible to hostile
big power conventional orces. An ability to conduct a Lebanon
type of pacification may be the condition for getting the local
parties to engage in responsible non-violent settlement of their
differences. Forces for this purpose need to be strong enough so
that the only way a mischievous great power can frustrate pacifi-
cation is by playing with the risky step of escalating the war into
a major one.
2. Conventional forces capable of defending perimeter
countries (all the way from Korea to Western Europe) against
reat power conventional forces. This is a controversial item,
for there are many who argue that the West cannot possibly have
conventional forces capable of fighting a World War II kind of
campaign in Western and Eastern Europe or for that matter in Asia.
It is, therefore, argued that the Western strategy would be to
escalate any such war into a nuclear one. Such reasoning assumes
quite wrongly that it is easier for the West to maintain a
decisive nuclear superiority than it is for it to maintain sub-
stantial equality in conventional forces. The strategic alterna-
tives, either of which would work, are decisive superiority in
The Necessity for Choice, New York: Harper Bros,1960, or in Arms Control,
iarmament and mationa Security, ed. by Donald Brennen, New Yor3d
Braziller,1961.
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nuclear weapons as a shield for weak conventional forces, or
relative equality with the foe in both nuclear and conventional
forces. If we had nuclear superiority we could, as noted above,
operate with conventional forces weaker than the enemy's, for
the foe would not dare really defeat our conventional forces.
But it is doubtful if the option of real nuclear superiority is open
to the West. It is hard to conceive of a situation where we would
with equanimity face the prospect of two-sided, even tactical,
nuclear warfare. Barring that prospect, we should not put our-
selves in the dilema of fighting a mutually catastrophic nuclear
war or of losing the conventional struggle. On the other hand
the West does have manpower and production adequate to maintain
conventional forces at least substantially equal to those it may have
to face. If it maintains such forces it will not need to use them
and it will be able to protect the free world by means short of such
war.
3. Tactical nuclear weapons. While these are weapons we do
not wish to use, we would wish to be able to use them with as much
of a margin in our favor as an active effort will permit. At best
we would like a superiority which we would not use, except for
its shadow effect. At worst we should not allow others that
superiority.
4. Strategic nuclear weapons. The issue of whether an
invulnerable counterforce system (i.e., a decisive advantage) is
technically possible lies beyond the scope of this paper. If it
were possible clearly we should want it. The West had something
like that advantage a decade ago when Churchill could rightly say
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that the peace and freedom of Europe rested on the American monopoly
of the atom bomb. Any American statesman would have seemed highly
irresponsible if he had then advocated disarmament. Very likely,
however such superiority can never be captured again and the beat
that either side can hope for is a nuclear stalemate, i.e., not
letting the other side gain a decisive advantage. If that is the
best available alternative then a finite deterrence policy follows
as sensible. From a stalemate there follows a mutual interest
in the control of those arms which can benefit neither side but can
hurt both. Given mutual nuclear deterrence, it is in the interest
of both sides to start disarming those weapons that neither side
wishes to see used.
. How far down the scale can this disarming go? The possibility
that one side may cheat on a disarmament agreement and the associated
problem of third order escalation require the maintenance of some
deterrent forces. Beyond such forces, disarmament in a stalemate
can be carried down the scale of violence to that point where, if
it were carried one step further a stalemate would no longer exist,
for one side would have a great advantage. Clearly the Soviets see
themselves as having such an advantage in a world where nuclear
arms are abolished. Witness their campaign for disarmament. For the
same reason America, fearful as it is of the horrifying consequences
of nuclear weapons, has approached disarmament with reluctance.
Looked at this way it is clear that the weakness of the United
29
States, except in nuclear weapons, is a major barrier to disarmament,
a major incentive to Soviet provocations, and a fact that is apt to
accelerate escalation. To build American conventional strength is
to facilitate nuclear disarmament and international stability.
